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Security Council Briefing on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2803

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[As delivered]

Madam President, Members of the Security Council,

Thank you for the opportunity to brief the Council again.

When I last appeared before you, I said that the credibility of any effort rests on telling the truth, including when it is uncomfortable. I intend to keep that promise today.

In March, I reported that a framework for the decommissioning of weapons existed and it had been put to the parties. In May, I presented to the Council the fifteen articles of the Roadmap itself. On 30 July, Hamas and Palestinian factions accepted the Roadmap for completing the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan for Gaza.

President Trump has called it a breakthrough. Indeed, it is a historic breakthrough. For the first time, Hamas and the armed factions in Gaza have agreed to hand over their weapons and to transfer full governing authority, civilian and security, to a transitional administration recognized by the United Nations.

We now have the opportunity to dramatically improve life in a sustainable way for Palestinians in Gaza; to provide durable security for Israelis; and to move from a conflict that has destabilized the region to an environment that offers peace, prosperity and economic opportunity for the entire Middle East. To achieve that transformation, we need the full implementation of the Comprehensive Plan and the Roadmap.

I know that some remain sceptical, I know that this Council has seen peace plans come and go and dissolve over time. It is, however, in the interest of Israelis and Palestinians alike, and of the entire region that this plan does not unravel.

The Roadmap does not replace or contradict the Comprehensive Plan or UNSC Resolution 2803. It starts by reaffirming both as the guiding international framework and operationalises what the Council has already decided.

It covers the decommissioning of every category; let me repeat that, every category of weapon in Gaza. There is no grey zone and no category left out.

Weapons are to be removed from factional control into the custody of the transitional National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) and to be rendered unusable under international supervision.

Withdrawal follows verified decommissioning and proceeds in phases. It is sequenced and reciprocal. Each step rests on the successful completion of the one before it.

Gaza cannot be disarmed in a fortnight. What the Roadmap fixes is not a date of completion, but the order in which things should happen, and the standard of proof required at each gate.

The National Committee is composed of independent Palestinian professionals. Every police officer they will hire will be vetted, and those who fail vetting will not carry a weapon. An Implementation Verification Committee (IVC) will certify compliance. It will be led by the Board of Peace and the United States and supported by the International Stabilization Force and the mediators.

Israel is not a signatory to the Roadmap and in fact we never asked it to be one. We asked Israel to reaffirm its commitments under the Comprehensive Plan and the Sharm el-Sheikh Protocol. While it has reaffirmed that framework, important questions of implementation still remain open.

Nothing in the Roadmap, Madam President, asks Palestinians to relinquish their rights and their aspirations. The credible pathway to a political horizon is in the Comprehensive Plan and it is reaffirmed in the Roadmap.

Madam President,

An agreed document on disarmament does not immediately mean a disarmed Gaza. But no one should understate that what was achieved in the Roadmap contains three things that did not exist at any point in time before us.

First, is acceptance. Hamas and the factions have accepted, in public, the Comprehensive Plan and the framework requiring their complete demilitarisation and a complete handover of governance in Gaza, civilian and security, direct and indirect.

The second is agreement on a key principle: One Authority, One Law, One Weapon. The claim of every armed movement around the world rests on the right to hold weapons outside the legitimate authority. This principle requires that the factions to relinquish that claim.

Thirdly is the architecture. Progress is performance-based, not calendar-based. A phase opens only when the previous one has been certified as completed. That constrains all sides, and all must understand it as such. Our approach in the implementation phase will be to trust nothing and verify everything.

What has been agreed on paper will matter only if it is translated into verified action.

Madam President, as you and the rest of the Council know quite well from your own experience.

Much of the debate about Gaza is a debate about weapons and the miserable conditions in the Strip. This is understandable. But Gaza's crisis has never been only a security or a humanitarian problem. It has always been a political and a governance problem.

For nearly twenty years, political authority, military power and public administration were fused into the hands of a militant faction that built up its arsenal and capabilities. Israel dealt with it as a security problem to be managed rather than resolved — an approach that neither disarmed that faction nor displaced it but it preserved it as the only address for everyone in Gaza.

The price paid for that *status quo* of two decades was paid in blood: repeated wars, economic collapse, isolation and immense suffering for both Israelis and Palestinians. That is why the alternative to armed rule cannot be built in the absence of a legitimate civilian authority.

Under UNSC resolution 2803, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was constituted in January. It is led by Dr. Ali Shaath and has developed into an administration that is ready for deployment. It has established its operational plans for policing, for public payments, for security, and for early recovery.

On security it has designed the structure of the future civilian police service and built the vetting system required to staff it.

It has prepared a six-month Gaza Recovery Programme drawn from a broader two-year plan, covering infrastructure, economic recovery, public administration, human development, digital transformation, legal affairs, peace and security, policing, weapons collection, decommissioning, and tunnel clearance.

The National Committee is not intended, and it will never be a replacement to the Palestinian Authority. Its purpose is to govern during the transition and restore effective administration.

Administrative transition will ultimately be judged not by the structures that we establish, but whether Palestinians experience greater security, more reliable services and a measurable improvement in their daily lives.

Madam President,

Before I turn to the humanitarian situation, let me say what no indicator can actually carry. Behind every story and every statistic from Gaza, there is real, human, personal and painful tragedy. Almost three years of war have left the people of Gaza bereaved, displaced and exhausted. Next to them live the families in Israel who lost their loved ones in the massacre of 7 October 2023. Grief in this conflict has never respected and will never respect lines, fences, borders or walls. Nothing said in this Chamber will restore what has been lost by the people. Unfortunately, vengeance will only beget more vengeance, and the cycle of pain will never end. However, what we owe all these families is not yet another expression of sympathy, but relief, security and a way out of the cycle of pain and suffering.

A year ago, almost to this day in fact day, the Famine Review Committee confirmed famine in Gaza— the first ever recorded in the region. In August 2025, one in seven children screened was acutely malnourished; nearly thirteen thousand were identified in a single month. Today the picture has significantly improved. By December 2025 the IPC had declared famine conditions offset, and its most recent survey found acute malnutrition mitigated across the Strip. That did not happen on its own. It was achieved through the partnership of the Board of Peace, the United Nations, the non-governmental organisations, bilateral and multilateral donors and the State of Israel.

I record it plainly, but I will not overstate it. These gains rest on sustained delivery. They are real, but they are also very easily reversible.

The pressing needs have now moved. They are sanitation, water and energy as well as the continuing restrictions on materials that can enter Gaza. Here too, through tireless work with the United Nations and the NGOs, we have a plan to address immediate WASH needs.

Several projects in fact have already been coordinated with Israel and approved in the areas of sanitation, clean water, and public health and we will be moving forward to implementation soon.

Despite this, OCHA has reported continuing shortfalls in funding and UN agencies are warning that the pipeline for food and other critical humanitarian items is at risk as early as the end of September this year. What is not settled is shelter. Winter is around the corner, and Israel's present policy on quality shelter is not acceptable. The Board of Peace urges the State of Israel to allow better shelter into the Strip, for dignity, for health and for safety.

The International Stabilization Force, Madam President, continues to generate under the command of U.S. Major General Jasper Jeffers, sites are being prepared, and further countries are joining those that have stepped forward. I thank them and I renew my appeal for continued contributions.

The Board of Peace and the ISF are also preparing a monitoring and compliance mechanism that will support the implementation moving forward. We will track implementation of the commitments by the parties and progress in the handover of governance responsibility to the National Committee. This is a critical tool to build confidence, track progress and identify obstacles early enough to address them.

Alongside, we are also implementing a very much needed deconfliction arrangement, a coordination cell and a liaison through which emerging threats can be raised and dealt with before they escalate.

In our last meeting with the Prime Minister of Israel, we went through his government’s concerns one by one and narrowed the areas that still require technical work. We reaffirmed a shared objective: a demilitarised Gaza that can never again pose a threat. We also agreed on a mechanism through which remaining questions will be settled, and the committees established for that purpose are already meeting. This is not a process that has stalled. It has moved from the negotiating table to the engineering table.

Madam President,

I will not pretend to this Council that the road ahead is going to be easy.

The first risk is the distance between what has been agreed and what is happening on the ground. Israeli strikes have continued since the Roadmap was accepted, and Palestinian civilians are still being killed. The ceasefire holds, and casualties have fallen sharply — but they have not stopped. A ceasefire in fact under which civilians are still buried is not yet one that the people of Gaza can really feel. Every use of force that does not answer an immediate threat, and every incident that the deconfliction mechanism was not asked to resolve, costs this process something very hard to buy back.

After three years of war and twenty years of military operations I ask, will another strike on a munitions depot stop Hamas from rearming or tightening its grip on Gaza? It will not. It only delays the demilitarization that would happen, and it obstructs the civilian transition that should take place to ensure that remilitarisation will not be possible in the future.

The second risk runs in the opposite direction. Hamas has committed to cease all military activities. That commitment is still to be met in full. Every weapon carried, every tunnel still worked and every convoy still obstructed sets the process back and hands an argument to those who want to resume war. And as experience has shown, it will be Palestinian civilians, women and children, who will bear the consequences.

Gaza, Madam President, does not have another catastrophe left in it. If this ceasefire collapses and the Strip spirals into another full escalation, there will be no Roadmap to return to, there will be no administration to deploy, and there will be nothing left of the ground to rebuild. That would not be a setback. It would be a point of no return for everyone.

The third risk is time. Another winter is coming for people living in rubble and in tents. Ceasefires that deliver nothing visible are not sustained by patience, they are only exhausted by it.

Madam President,

None of that is an argument for stopping. It is an argument for knowing exactly what comes next. Three things must be in place for the process to move forward: the ISF needs to be able to deploy; Israel's undertakings under the Sharm el-Sheikh Protocol need to be implemented; and Hamas must adhere to its commitments.

It is then that we can begin in those areas that conditions are best. The National Committee and the ISF will enter Gaza: The Committee will begin to exercise its civil governance while completing vetting and handover procedures. Police weapons will be handed over to the Committee's custody for dismantling. Heavy weapons, depots, tunnels and production sites will be declared and moved for decommissioning. Militia and light weapons will also be decommissioned.

That unlocks real change that people can actually see: civil police rather than armed men on the streets, shelter before winter, recovery and rehabilitation and the prospect of reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal.

Reconstruction at scale will follow verified and irreversible progress on demilitarisation. It is the only way to ensure that what is built is not going to be destroyed again.

Madam President,

Finally, I have three requests of this Council.

First, please say plainly and repeatedly what this Council has already decided. The complete decommissioning of weapons in Gaza and the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement are requirements of the framework endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803 and the only route to Israeli withdrawal, reconstruction at scale, and creating the conditions for a credible political path towards Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

Second, I call on all Member States to work with the Board of Peace, and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, as well as the United Nations to ensure that the necessary support and resources are mobilized. The International Stabilization Force requires troops, equipment and enabling capabilities. The National Committee requires support for police training, public administration and recovery. Gaza’s students, the sick and the injured, require countries willing to host them and provide education opportunities and medical treatment.

And last but not least, please preserve the political destination of this transition.

Madam President,

There is an old saying in the Middle East: trust in God but tie your camel.

That is, more or less, the architecture of this Roadmap. No one is asked to rely on anyone else's good faith.

But a mechanism is only a mechanism. It cannot manufacture political will, and it cannot manufacture time. What it can do is remove excuses. After the Roadmap, no one can credibly say that there is no framework, that the obligations are unclear, or that compliance cannot be measured.

One question I am often asked: is there an alternative? I have heard some object to the Roadmap. I have yet to hear an alternative plan. Yet, I see only two choices.

The first is Israeli reoccupation of Gaza, with one party governing two million people at a massive human, economic and reputational cost.

The second is to allow the *status quo* that produced 7 October 2023, and everything that has followed it, to quietly reassemble itself: a Gaza in which Hamas is neither disarmed nor removed from governance, but managed — contained. That is not a new policy. Neither option is a strategy. And both are actually postponement, and both end in the same place.

What remains is actually a choice.

A Gaza disarmed, rebuilt and reconnected to the world.

Or a Gaza rearmed, divided and in rubble, with a radicalised generation raised inside it and the next war already on the horizon.

Thank you,